Taming the Floods: Using an Intellectual History of Chinese Hydraulic Thought to Address Contemporary Issues in China’s Water Governance by Danison, Sophia Rose
University of Vermont
ScholarWorks @ UVM
Environmental Studies Electronic Thesis Collection Undergraduate Theses
2018
Taming the Floods: Using an Intellectual History of
Chinese Hydraulic Thought to Address
Contemporary Issues in China’s Water Governance
Sophia Rose Danison
The University of Vermont
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/envstheses
This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Theses at ScholarWorks @ UVM. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Environmental Studies Electronic Thesis Collection by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UVM. For more information,
please contact donna.omalley@uvm.edu.
Recommended Citation
Danison, Sophia Rose, "Taming the Floods: Using an Intellectual History of Chinese Hydraulic Thought to Address Contemporary





Taming the Floods: Using an Intellectual History of Chinese Hydraulic 
Thought to Address Contemporary Issues in China’s Water Governance 
 
 
Sophia Rose Danison 
 
 
A senior thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 




College of Arts and Sciences 





Thomas Donnelly Noel, Lecturer and Visiting Instructor of Chinese, UVM 




























 I offer my sincerest gratitude and appreciation toward my thesis advisors, Thomas 
Donnelly Noel and Robert Bartlett, for their continued support and guidance throughout this 
project. I cannot express how grateful I am for two patient and skilled mentors to help see me 
through this often challenging, yet fully rewarding, experience.  
 
 I hold a wealth of gratitude for the love of my family. Mom (and the cats), Dad, Johnny, 
and my loving grandparents, I thank you for your unwavering commitment to my wellbeing 
throughout my college journey. When at last I walk across the graduation stage, it will fill me 
with such pride to represent this family. 
 
 Lastly, I wish to thank the Environmental Program at UVM for providing me with such 
an insightful, personalized and beneficial education. After graduation, I will carry myself into the 












  China’s current hydraulic systems are in a state of atrophy, caused by sustained 
damage over centuries to infrastructure that has changed very little. Added to an already weak 
infrastructure is a relatively new crisis of water scarcity, which is forcing the Chinese 
government to allocate water resources between industry, agriculture, and people. As a state 
accustomed to water control without the context of scarcity, the state’s current governance 
structures are ill-equipped to solve the current crisis in sustainable fashion. The state is reluctant 
to approach non-traditional methods of water governance, and this resistance can be attributed to 
over two-thousand years of state authority over water control. This paper seeks to pose a 
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Global water scarcity is a contender for one of the direst environmental situations of the 
modern era. Statistically, 2.1 billion people lack access to clean drinking water services, 4.5 
billion people suffer from lack of sanitation, and 90 percent of total natural disasters are water-
related, to name a few (United Nations, 2018). In many ways, water itself interferes with the 
international order; it disobeys borders, and shares the boundaries between countries; freshwater 
is not evenly distributed across the globe, and changing climate patterns combined with 
geospatial patterns determine its outcomes. National boundaries and the global order conflict 
with water’s flow patterns. Global water resource management and distribution is internationally 
contested, though the responsibility to manage available water resources in each territory is 
subject to individual systems of governance. Water scarcity is also inextricably entwined within 
broader debates over security, justice, and the right to governance.  
Rob Nixon (2011) uses the term “slow violence” to encapsulate how modern systems of 
order are conflicting with the slow progression of ecological time. He writes of human 
temporalities as brief, flitting from one technological era to the next while the slower geological 
motions, habitats and landscapes absorb the collateral damage. Nixon writes, 
 
Change is a cultural constant but the pace of change is not. Hence the temporal contests 
over how to sustain, regenerate, exhaust, or obliterate the landscape as resource become 
critical. More than material wealth is here at stake: imposed official landscapes typically 
discount spiritualized vernacular landscapes, severing webs of accumulated cultural 
 7 
meaning and treating the landscape as if it were uninhabited by the living, the unborn, 
and the animate deceased. (Nixon, 2011, 17) 
 
China’s landscape, climate and society is a major recipient of the effects of slow 
violence. China is a society has sustained thousands of years of civilization, and has done so by 
constructing longstanding forms of social order. The Chinese interpretation of the very nature of 
humanity is reflected in the construction of social order, kinship networks, political and 
governance structures, and infrastructural systems. Over time, these systems have sustained slow 
violence, through ideological manifestations of violence affecting perceptions of order, and in 
the form of ecological damage caused by resource depletion and landscape destruction. The 
modern era has brought these issues to a point of crisis, and the Chinese state now faces the need 
to modify its governance to assess these crises. However, the state is also plagued by a loss of 
solid ideological foundations, demonstrated by an imbalance of resource allocation. Its 
consequences are what Nixon (2011) describes as "...visible reminders of theft [by the state] 
through modernity's infrastructural invasions – by oil pipelines or massive hydroelectric dams or 
toxic tailing from mines – foment rage at life-threatening environmental degradation combined 
with the state's failure to provide life-enabling public works" (42). The following project is an 
attempt to understand China’s contemporary environmental challenges not as recent, but rather 
as long-sustained slow violence to a system of governance rooted in historical tradition. 
The first section will present historical evidence of longstanding patterns of unsustainable 
governance methods contributing to the persistence of ecological damage. The second section 
will identify current water crises, and introduce associated methods of governance to mitigate the 
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resultant damage. The final section will present cases to support the conclusions drawn in the 























The Evidence of Longstanding Social Order in China 
 
The Way of the Sages 
 
In China’s deep antiquity, legend has it that the ancient sages took control of water to 
create order. In the myths, the pre-civilization world was overrun with rampant wilderness. Flora 
and fauna dominated the landscape, and a consistent deluge of unrestrained waters rendered the 
soil impossible to cultivate (Lewis, 2006) . The sages were comprised of various kings and 
heroes whose collective aim was to create organized civilization out of the chaos. 
Such accounts were recorded by Han historian Sima Qian (demonstrated in (Watson, 
1961), as well as the classics of ancient Chinese literature such as the Shangshu (a Book of 
History written by Confucius), and comprised the widely regarded origin myths of China. They 
document the unconfirmed Xia (Hsia) Dynasty (circa 2100-1600 B.C.), founded by the sage king 
Yu the Great (2200-2101 B.C.), a prominent hero figure of the legends. Prior to his entrance, the 
landscape was unruly, absent of a distinction between Man and Nature: 
 
...The historical work of the sages in early Chinese accounts had been to separate humans 
from the animal domain. Virtually all the philosophical traditions spoke of a primitive 
age when humans had lived both physically and morally unseparated from animals. The 
sages had created the tools and introduced the moral and ritual practices that rescued 
people from their animal condition and created distinctions where none had existed 
before...Yu’s taming the flood and thereby fixing the Nine Provinces [demonstrated] that 
for the authors of the Shan hai jing the ending of the flood was the final step in the sages’ 
work of creating an orderly world. (Lewis, 2006) 
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Among the sages, Yu was most accredited for his role as a flood tamer, for establishing 
control over the waterways of the landscape and thus enabling a pathway for social civilization 
to safely emerge. To make this final step toward establishing society, Yu determined that the 
unchecked waters were inhibiting humans from establishing their own formal boundaries within 
nature. Without constant flooding, the people would be able to participate in agriculture and form 
the basis of society. Yu set about restraining the floods by reshaping the very land itself; in doing 
so, he redirected the rivers into manageable arrangements, and facilitated the development of 
irrigation methods. In a famous treatise, the historian Sima Qian describes Yu’s overall efforts as 
spanning the course of ten years, without rest (Watson, 1961). After he was able to successfully 
reduce the potential for floods, the people were able to settle along the riverbanks and raise 
crops. 
Physical space plays an important role in the stories of the sages. Notable is the way in 
which they utilized their understanding of the world’s elements to systematically separate the 
ordered realm (occupied by humans) from the disordered realm (occupied by nonhumans and 
spirits). In the flood taming myths, natural disasters represent a blurring of these realms, and 
must be expelled. Prior to Yu’s arrival, “placing the early sages amid the monstrous peoples at 
the edges of the earth was related to emerging representations of power within the imperial state” 
(Lewis, 2006, 72). These representations were not solidified until Yu organized the rivers, 
described as follows: 
 
…The earliest systematic account of Yu’s taming the flood takes the form of an account 
of his physical travels in the course of his toils and the manner in which these establish a 
model for the flow of tribute from the periphery to the center. This literal ‘flow’ that 
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moves along the rivers established by Yu’s channeling of the flood established the 
relations of center and periphery that defined the structure of the newly ordered world. 
(Lewis, 2006, 72) 
 
 
Yu successfully created these physical boundaries, and at last the sages and rulers would 
be able to predict and organize the movement of the rivers. From there, the challenge to maintain 
this control and its associated societal consequences would extend throughout the rest of the 
myths and legends, and reappear throughout Chinese history. The sages were keen on chartering 
the movements found in nature, to better understand its properties and thus be able to categorize 
natural phenomena. This extended into a cosmology that intrinsically linked humans, society, 
politics and the state. Historian Nathan Sivin (1995) expands this notion as central to Chinese 
modes of understanding, especially as the state continued to develop. He writes: 
 
In the third century B.C., as the process of invention got under way, intellectuals bound 
the structure of heaven and earth, and that of the human body, to that of the state. This 
was not unprecedented in China, but now the links were made systematic and tight. In 
every instance their creators were preoccupied with political authority and its effective 
use. As a result, macrocosm and microcosms became a single manifold, a set of mutually 
resonant systems of which the emperor was indispensable mediator. (7) 
 
Thus, the interplay of state authority and human social order has remained essential to the 
stability of China throughout history and into the modern era. The act of flood taming and water 
control is one demonstration of the ways in which that order is kept.  
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Historian Mark Edward Lewis (2006) identifies the floods in creation myths as 
representing “universal social disorder” (49). Since Yu took control of the waterways of China in 
order to draw a margin between man and wilderness, the return of the flood would signify a 
collapse of those boundaries. The rest of the associated myths build off of this theme, wherein 
the event of flooding represents wilderness encroaching into society and destroying political and 
social dominion. These can be categorized into two different types of myth.  
The first type directly links flooding to “human criminality” (Lewis, 2006), or a human-
driven intent to destroy societal structures. These myths often contain criminals who seek to 
bring calamity, and heroes like Yu who are able to apprehend them. The second type presents the 
flood as a result of criminal and rebel action, in which the wrongdoers must be apprehended and 
punished before the floodwaters can be restrained. This version uses the flood as a consequence, 
rather than the direct offender. In these myths “the rampant waters served as the image or 
embodiment of the more general problem of resistance to the state order” (Lewis, 2006). 
One such example are the stories of Gong Gong. In the myths, Gong Gong was depicted 
as the criminal equivalent to floods, and in others he desired to bring about the floods 
themselves. He renounced the "Way" of the sages like Yu, and sought to bring about societal 
collapse (Lewis, 2006, 56). He muddled up the separation of high and low in river systems, 
properties integral to flood prevention by keeping the flow of the water in check. In this way, he 
literally used flooding to try to damage human settlement. In other stories, criminals like Gong 
Gong would seek to destroy aspects of civic life and government, participating in “criminality, 
bad government, and intellectual deviance that threatened the social order” (Lewis, 2006, 53). In 
this indirect fashion, they sought calamity and brought about flooding as a manifestation of the 
destruction of order.   
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Cultivating Order Through Society 
 
The flood myths informed Confucius’s ideas about categorizing natural phenomena into 
templates for societal order. Confucius, and later his disciples, then in turn formed the teachings 
that would dominate the Chinese system of ethics and philosophy for the next two thousand 
years.  
More specifically, Confucius was presented with a world in disarray. He lived during the 
Spring and Autumn period (551-479 B.C.), during which time China was not unified into a 
single empire. He lived in “an environment where generally chaos reigned [between the feudal 
states] ...Aristocratic pastimes, hunting, war and extravagant living, laid crushing burdens on the 
common people, while at all levels human life was cheap." (Needham & Wang, 1956). 
Confucius was dissatisfied with this, noting that the land was overrun with the "heterodox" 
theories of other thinkers of the time (Lewis, 2006, 52). He equated the teachings of these men 
with failure to effectively separate man from wilderness. He said, "Master Yang's advocacy of 
being for oneself means having no ruler. Master Mo's advocacy of caring equally for all means 
having no father. To have no ruler and no father means to be a bird or beast" (Lewis, 2006, 52). 
Confucius looked to the past successes of the sages as a means for cultivating order. After 
his grand works like The Spring and Autumn Annals became the blueprint for Chinese society, 
Confucius too was included amongst the sages, for his contribution to preventing the floods: 
 
Long ago Yu suppressed the flood and the world became level. The Duke of Zhou 
conquered the barbarians, expelled the wild beasts, and the peasants were at peace. 
Confucius completed the Annals and rebellious ministers and criminal sons became 
afraid...  (Lewis, 2006, 52) 
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To remove power from the rebels and criminals, Confucius formed a system of order that 
focused entirely on human society. Mencius (372-289 B.C.), a prominent Confucian disciple, 
further connected Confucian order to the ways of the sages like Yu in the following: 
 
The five grains ripened and the people were nourished. The way of people is that if they 
have sufficient food and warm clothing, but live at ease without instruction, then they are 
close to the [birds] and the beasts. The sages worried over this, and had Qie serve as 
Minister of the Masses. He instructed them in human relations. There was a kinship 
between fathers and sons, duty between rulers and ministers, distinction between 
husbands and wives… (Lewis, 2006, 50) 
 
 
 His teachings strayed from those before his time, in that he enabled a new interpretation 
of good and harmonious conduct. This conduct could be found by maintaining kinship in a 
hierarchical fashion.  Confucius asserted that "the true aim of the government ought to be the 
welfare and happiness of the whole people, and that this would be brought about not by rigid 
adherence to enacted arbitrary law, but by subtle administration of customs generally accepted as 
good and having the sanction of natural law" (Needham & Wang, 1956, 1971). Through 
administration led according to kinship values, a harmonious system could be established. 
Mencius would later add to the teachings by reassigning the role of Heaven from nature, and 
place it on the people. He extracted more applicable democratic ideals from Confucian teachings; 
he considered the wellbeing of the people as essential to the workings of a government. His 
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famous mandate, "Heaven sees according as the People see, Heaven hears according as the 
People hear" (Needham, 1956, 16), has become a staple of Chinese philosophy. 
Confucian values also forged a new distancing of humans and nature. A harmonious 
society would consist of Man existing in congruence with Nature, but not in definitively separate 
realms. So, ideas of social virtue, goodness and justice follow as direct extensions of Heaven 
itself, and are thus dictated in the same way as nature. Natural phenomena that occur without 
ready explanation would be designated to the spiritual realm, rather than dwelled upon using 
scientific means of explanation; Confucius had little interest in discussing events outside of the 
realm of human relationships and society (Needham & Wang, 1956, 15). His legacy formed an 
intensive focus on human order in both governance and society, while remaining somewhat lax 
toward those affixed on understanding the matters of nature. He largely considered the Daoists to 
be socially irresponsible for their adherence to allowing the way of Nature to dictate human 
activity (Needham & Wang, 1956, 16). By placing emphasis on governance and society as 
dictated by social relationships, Confucianism brought about a new construction of order based 
on human control.  
To understand the role of water in Confucian order, the flood can be revisited. Lewis 
(2006) characterizes water control as a physical groundwork for more complex systems, or an 
“organizing principle” of authority (72); in mismanaged water systems, the consequent flood 
represents geophysical anarchy, and therefore a danger to society: 
 
In short, the mythic flood here serves as a historical occasion for and a physical image of 
a social chaos produced by the collapse of social distinctions. Yu's fashioning of an 
ordered physical space through dredging the rivers and guiding them into the sea is only 
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one step in the larger process of constructing an ordered and hierarchically divided 
human realm in which the central role is played by the family as a social unit (Lewis, 
2006, 50) 
 
 Here, the flood takes on a more symbolic meaning of disaster. To administer control over 
water systems means that the state is protecting the people, and flooding means mismanagement 
of that authority. Mencius extrapolated on this idea in his teachings, particularly in his 
discussions with King Hui of Liang during the Warring States period (circa 475-221 B.C.). From 
Book 1A3, the following is recorded: 
 
 King Hui of Liang said, “I... [devote my] entire mind to the state. When the year is bad 
within the river, I transfer people to the east of the river and transfer grain to the area 
within the river. When the year is bad to the east of the river, again, I act accordingly.” 
(Mengzi, 2009). 
  
Mencius responded to this with advice for the king to allow the people to cultivate 
according to natural processes and rhythms. For instance, on harvesting fish he says, "If close-
meshed nets are not allowed in the pools and ponds, there will be more fish and turtles than can 
be eaten" (Mengzi, 2009, 3). He thus suggested a method of governance based on proper 
stewardship of nature according to the needs of the people. Where Daoist thought would 
cultivate materials with as little human interference as possible, Confucianism emphasizes 
responsible management of natural order.  
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The “paramount social importance of floods” (Needham, 1971, 223) is stressed in 
Confucian accounts. In the Kuan Tzu book (pre-Han Dynasty), there is evidence of a correlation 
between the physical and the social role of the flood: 
 
Once impeded, [the water] runs wild. Running wild, it injures men. When it injures men, 
there arises great distress among them. In great distress they treat the laws lightly. Laws 
being treated lightly, it is difficult to maintain good order. Good order lapsing, filial piety 
disappears. And when people have lost filial piety, they are no longer submissive... 
(Needham, 1971, 223) 
 
 Good hydraulic maintenance is required to keep the waters from running unchecked, and 
in historical China this was achieved when water systems governance followed Confucian order. 
Tales recorded in the Treatise on the Yellow River and Canals by the Han historian Sima Qian 
(Ssu-ma Ch’ien) demonstrated transgressions in proper governance, though not always 
intentional. In one instance, during the reign of Emperor Wu (circa 141-87 B.C.), the Yellow 
River broke from its canals at multiple points, forming new channels. The emperor was inclined 
to repair the breaches, however:  
 
At this time T'ien Fen, the marquis of Wu-an, was serving as chancellor and his income 
came from an estate in Shu. Shu is located north of the Yellow River, and since the break 
was on the southern side, suffered no damage from floods; on the contrary the revenue 
from the estate actually increased. T'ien Fen said to the emperor, "Breaks in the banks of 
the Yangtze and the Yellow River are all the work of Heaven. It is no easy task to stop up 
such breaks forcibly by human labor, and indeed to do so would hardly be in accord with 
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the will of Heaven!" The emperor therefore hesitated and for a long time made no further 
attempts to repair the break. (Watson, 1961) 
 
 It was then assumed that the break in the river was destined to be so, in this case 
betraying Mencius’s adherence of the will of Heaven belonging to the people. This story is 
followed up by tales of more changes to the Yellow River made during Emperor Wu’s reign; 
these changes almost always serve some sort of purpose to localities. For instance, people would 
suggest using new breaches to irrigate stretches of farmland, or dig new canals to make 
transporting grain more efficient (Watson, 1961, 72-74).  
Later, a period of drought and instability ensued, and the Emperor Wu was so distraught 
that he composed a song about the damage caused by the river. In his song, he lamented the 
alterations that had been made to the river by his administration, and sang of the freely 
encroaching wilderness: 
 
The river raged from its boundaries… 
 It has left its constant course… 
Dragons and water monsters leap forth, 
Free to wander afar. (Watson, 1961, 76) 
 
He then wished for the "return to the old channel", and spoke of the lack of resources 
impeding his administration from being able to stop up the water. He blamed the people of Wei 
for this, not himself. Following his song, the emperor himself set about returning the river to the 
channels it followed during the time of Yu. 
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Water Governance as Integral to State Stability 
 
A brief survey of Chinese hydrualic systems is necessary to give appropriate context to 
these tales of water governance in historical China. The most noteworthy aspect of management 
and governance of these systems is how little it has fundamentally changed over time. Like the 
above story of Emperor Wu, who found solutions in returning to past hydraulic methods, so too 
has the rest of historical China shown continuity in water management.  
 This is not to say that regional control systems did not vary, and change over time; as 
sinologist Mark Elvin (2004) puts it, water control was not a “changeless bedrock of despotism” 
(117), it was subject to shifts in technology and changes in the climate and landscape. Despite 
superficial changes, Elvin (2004) introduces a premodern “technological lock-in” which began to 
afflict the Chinese water-control economy by the eighteenth century. The phenomenon describes 
a technological system in which an already established infrastructure is prioritized over more 
efficient alternatives. Elvin uses it to describe the idea that the existing Chinese hydraulic 
infrastructure was so thoroughly developed and engrained within society and economy that 
trying to overhaul or replace it would be a significant loss on investment, so to speak. The 
modern time period has afforded new technological pathways, though “the magnificent but 
onerous heritage of the past remains” (Elvin, 2004, 124). The primary reasons for how this 
phenomenon gradually atrophied the Chinese hydraulic system has explanations based in both 
government ideology and economic structural realities.  
The ideological foundations of the Chinese hydraulic system are demonstrated in the 
myths and records. The Confucian majority held sway over not only politics and governance, but 
also sectors of engineering and hydraulic works. As an agricultural economy, water control and 
allocation was central to state interest. Various regions received alternating state attention based 
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on fertility and output potential, control over which was often entrenched in political and 
socioeconomic debates. Hydraulic structure and design was also subject to competing ideologies 
in China, such as Confucian and Daoist engineers who maintained separate opinions of the 
nature of water. The various schools of thought argued over things such as placement of dykes 
and levees, based on an overall perception of how best to manage flows of water.   
There was dispute between Daoists and Confucians over the overall hydraulic structure 
for flood control, wherein some engineers favored high dykes, and others preferred deep 
channels. Deeper than that, "it took the form of a conflict between two systems of morality, one 
in [favor] of confining and repressing Nature, the other in [favor] of letting Nature take her 
course, or even assisting her to return to it if necessary" (Needham & Wang, 1971, 249). The 
Confucians referred to dykes and levees as extensions of law and order, methods to force the 
river to conform to flow patterns that would complement human society. Daoist thought favored 
methods that would not obstruct existing natural sequence like excavating deeper river beds. In 
terms of water systems governance, the Confucian side generally won. 
Following the Iron Age (circa 510 B.C. and onward), the various Chinese states, and later 
its unified nation, had the sheer numbers required to create major hydraulic feats accompanied 
by private land ownership. Additionally, the "geo-climatic conditions of China exerted an 
irresistible influence upon Chinese society in the direction of strengthening [centralized] 
government" (Needham, 1971, 264). Especially in terms of the major projects, Chinese civic 
engineers had to plan for river systems that transcended feudal boundaries. Joseph Needham 
(1971) uses an excerpt from an imperial edict to illustrate this point, in which agriculture is 
designated as "the basis of the whole world," from which people can obtain food and over which 
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only the central government can oversee in its entirety (264). Coupled with Confucian authority, 
the state would frequently play a dominant role in hydraulic projects of increasing scale. 
The economic basis for maintaining water systems can now be explored while keeping in 
mind the ideological basis for both stringent, state oriented control of water resources, coupled 
with a focus on agricultural production. The economic order followed Confucian tradition of 
social order, ideally prioritizing the people over the wealth of the state. Records from the 
statesman Chao Cuo (178 B.C.) during the Han period demonstrate a reverence for maintaining 
this tradition: 
 
The reason people never suffered from cold or famine under the rule of the sage kinds 
was...that they opened up for the people the way to wealth... Provisions had been stored 
up in plenty and all precaution taken beforehand… An enlightened ruler, realizing this, 
will encourage his people in agriculture and sericulture, lighten the poll tax and other 
levies, increase his store of supplies and fill his granaries in preparation for flood and 
drought. Thereby he can keep and care for his people. The people may then be led by the 
ruler, for they will follow after profit in any direction like water flowing downward. 
(Watson, 1999) 
 
 Giving agricultural products and essential objects higher value than nonessentials would 
reflect good state behavior, in this case. Up until the Han period, this was the economic standard 
in Chinese policy. At this point the balance between government spending and allowing private 
behavior shifted, and expansion was the cause. During the agricultural crisis of Emperor Wu’s 
administration, the state was faced with internal crisis, and at the same time was conducting a 
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campaign of imperial expansion. In order to increase state revenue and refund the costs of 
imperial expansion, Emperor Wu targeted the traders and industrialists with amassed fortunes, 
exploiting them with any excuse in order to divert their wealth back to the state. He created 
"government monopolies in iron, salt, liquor, and coinage of money..." (Watson, 1999, 359) in 
order to grow the imperial treasury. These measures strengthened government revenues but 
spread poverty to the people. Following his demise, the famous Discourses on Salt and Iron (盐
铁论 Yantie lun) occurred between top Legalist officials and Confucian advocates to either 
continue or end these policies. 
 The Legalists were a rival faction to the Confucians, originating around a similar time 
period.  The Legalists flourished during the -3rd Century (a tumultuous Qin dynasty just before 
the Han). Their position held that the Confucian style of a paternalistic government was not 
sufficient for an authoritarian state. Confucian administration relied on li, a combination of 
"customs, usages, ceremonies and compromises...administered according to Confucian ideals" 
(Needham, 1956, 205).  The Legalists instead promoted fa, positive law that were already fixed 
for the people to follow. To some extent, positive law separated the law from the ruler; with the 
former set in place without requiring perpetual morality checks, the ruler would be less actively 
involved with daily legal processes. As opposed to Mencius' assertion of the direct connection 
between the people and Heaven, Legalist theory supposed that "Law is the authoritative principle 
for the people, and is the basis of government; it is what shapes the people" (Needham, 1956, 
206). A strong juridical backbone would guarantee an orderly society, so long as people were 
kept well in check through a system of tough discipline. The Legalist doctrine is indicative of a 
more severe totalitarian method than Confucianism; a despotic ruler combined with harsh 
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punishment for disobedience, while traditions and artistic or scholarly pursuits represent 
"Parasitic" (Needham, 1956, 208) functions that weaken the State. According to Needham, 
 
The phenomenon of the Legalists was part of that great revolution during which Chinese 
society passed out of its classical stage. When the wave receded, the intermediate feudal 
lords were no longer there, but nor was authoritarian positive law unrelated to ethics; 
only the bureaucracy, administered by Confucians rooted in custom and compromise, 
remained as the permanent network of government in a society based on agriculture and 
hydraulic engineering" (1956, 215). 
 
 However, this bureaucracy also no longer adhered to classical Confucian tradition. 
During the Discourses on Salt and Iron, some Legalist advisors of the Emperor invited a small 
group of Confucian scholars to attempt to advocate against state monopolies. The government 
argued that fiscal policies were necessary to maintain defensive warfare in expanded areas, and 
protect the people from exploitation for private gain. The Confucians responded that expansion 
was unnecessary, and China should retain its traditional boundaries. Government monopolies 
were harming the people by impoverishing them and forcing them to use goods of lower quality, 
and created new competition between the government and its own people (the private sector). 
Increased foreign trade brought with it unnecessary luxuries. (Watson, 1999, 360). Officially, the 
debates ended without a definite conclusion, and the monopolies held. The Discourses would 
repeatedly crop up in the form of either peasant revolts or challenges to this Legalist stronghold 
of economic order throughout the rest of history.  
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The nature of these debates concerning the economic priorities of the state should be 
considered in the forthcoming discussion of Chinese hydraulic systems. Governance of these 
systems involves multiple administrative levels, even within a state that idealizes authority over 
water control. In this way, “hydraulic despotism is not a total myth, but, as should be apparent 
from the above, an inadequate description of a more complex system that also changed over time 
(Elvin, 2004, 118). Over time, however, rising population pressures and atrophy caused by 
pollution and growing scarcity of water systems prompted the formation of new socio-political 
organization toward hydraulic systems - that being increased state involvement.  
Given that hydraulic systems are already a massive source of resource consumption, the 
Chinese state has increasingly spent additional resources alternating between new irrigation, 
transport and water control projects, or trying to reverse and commandeer deviant sections of the 
river. Elvin (2004) calls this behavior paradoxical; he writes, 
 
The same skill in water control that had contributed so greatly to the development of the 
Chinese economy in ancient, medieval, and even in the early part of late-imperial times, 
slowly fashioned a straitjacket that in the end hindered any easy reinvention of the 
economic structure… Hydrological systems kept twisting free from the grip of human 
would-be mastery, drying out, silting up, flooding over, or changing their channels. By 
doing so they devoured the resources needed to keep them under control or serviceable. 
And made these resources unavailable for other purposes...No other society reshaped its 
hydraulic landscape with such sustained energy as did the Chinese, nor on such a scale, 
but the dialectic of long-term interaction with the environment transformed what had 
been a one-time strength into a source of weakness. (164) 
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At the same time, maintaining the vestiges of a premodern hydraulic system faces 
pressures from natural changes in flow patterns, sediment deposits and ecological systems 
changes. The Chinese methodology for complete control over water systems conflicts with the 
inherent changing of an ecological system. Economically, this results in “far more [being] spent 
over the long run on maintaining a system that is ever expended on its creation… Once the 
opportunities that are profitable given a particular level of skill have been used up, trying to go 
further is a waste of resources.” (Elvin, 2004, 120). Even with this conclusion, the modern 
Chinese system is, in a sense, stuck. A complete overhaul of the existing hydraulic system would 
require not only a complete reshaping of societal structure, but it would require even greater 
amounts of energy and resources to achieve. Thus, the state must find new solutions to confront a 













Flood Taming in Modern China 
 
 
“Mencius said, ‘The trees of the Niu mountain were once beautiful. Being 
situated, however, in the borders of a large State, they were hewn down with axes 
and bills - and could they retain their beauty? Still through the activity of the 
vegetative life day and night, and the nourishing influence of the rain and dew, 
they were not without buds and sprouts springing forth, but then came the cattle 
and goats and browsed upon them. To these things is owing the bare and stripped 
appearance of the mountain, and when people now see it, they think it was never 
finely wooded. But is this the nature of the mountain? And so also of what 
properly belongs to man; shall it be said that the mind of any man was without 
benevolence and righteousness?” 
 
- Taken from Gaozi I (J. Legge, trans.) 
 
Based in the myths and passed down through historical records has been the longstanding 
establishment of the Chinese state as flood tamer. Water control has been central to state 
authority as the integral resource needed for an agricultural economy. With a recent shift from 
agriculture to manufacturing as the dominant sector of China’s economy, the role of water is no 
longer as cut and dry as the myths suggest, and demands new and complex forms of governance 
that challenge longstanding ideologies. New floods manifest in the form of environmental and 
social pressures which place the stability of the state and its interaction with the people at a 
crossroads. A series of identity crises have emerged within the past century for the Chinese 
government, in terms of how much influence it should exert over both social livelihoods and 
industry, in the wake of a rapidly globalizing and modernizing world. As a governance structure 
stabilized by deep ties with both philosophical ideologies and valuing highly structured kinship 
networks, China faces new outside pressures which compromise the legitimacy of these 
longstanding institutions. Water itself plays an even more perilous role in modern Chinese 
society, wherein a hydraulic structure with two thousand-year-old roots is strained with a new 
crisis of scarcity.  
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Brief Overview of the Modern Era 
 
Deng Xiaoping’s decades-long “Reform and Opening” (gaige kaifang 改革开放) period 
of development involved comprehensive economic reform and political modernization intended 
to launch China’s economy out of its stagnation from the Mao Zedong era. Deng’s 
administration allowed development of a semi-capitalist economy, incorporating market forces 
and designating special economic zones to create incentives for increased production output. No 
one was prepared for the breakneck industrialization that ensued; the prospect of new wealth 
enticed every family household to produce steel out of backyard furnaces to escape the abject 
poverty that Mao’s legacy left behind. A state-owned enterprise system faced new competition 
from lessened restrictions on privatization, and factory bosses sought ways to cut production 
corners to generate maximum output at minimal cost. The weak environmental policy in place at 
the time did little to prevent the ensuing widespread deforestation, pollution of waterways, 
landscape destruction and severe air pollution, because there were so few enforcement 
mechanisms for environmental policy in place at the local and provincial levels.  
 This pace of growth was unsustainable; it generated massive amounts of pollution and 
allocated a disproportionate amount of resources towards heavy machinery and energy 
production. China now faces a gradual deceleration of growth due to increased international 
pressures for sustainability, as well as a new need to rebalance its energy and resource 
consumption away from industrial production. The Communist Party is seeking to consolidate its 
authoritative control once again at the state level, to make production more efficient and exert 
greater control over resource allocation. This extends to environmental policymaking as well; the 
state is gradually shifting from a decentralized approach to the state applying top-down control to 
reign in local activities (Kostka and Nahm 2017). This pivot is accompanied by the concurrent 
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horizontal expansion of a civil society composed of associations formed by grassroots 
movements, individual activists, domestic and foreign non-governmental organizations (NGO) 
responding in turn to the many perceived social, environmental and political issues arisen from 
the reform era. This movement is both characterized and complicated by the advent of social 
media and reporting technology, and increased foreign interest by external organizations seeking 
to interact within China.  
 
Factoring Water Scarcity into State Governance 
 
 China is separated geographically into water-scarce and water-secure regions based on 
processes of desertification reducing water capacity in aquifers that serve as water sources for 
major cities. Water scarcity entails the lack of access to clean drinking water, as well as water 
used for hydration purposes, and is divided into subcategories including economic scarcity and 
physical scarcity (“Water Scarcity” 2014). Rapid industrialization and urbanization in the 
modern period motivated the state to concentrate its scarce clean and accessible water resources 
in urban centers, resulting in mass migration of citizens from rural provinces (Dalin et al. 2015). 
The government attempted to restrict these outflows of migrants with residency laws in cities, 
resulting in illegal groups of people in cities, and even more displaced migrants in transit 
(Shapiro 2012, 48).  
Policy-wise, some provinces are designated as “water exporting” (Zhao et al. 2015), or 
are made to transfer their water via dams or man-made channels to drought-stricken areas like 
Beijing and its surrounding territory. They are then left lacking substantial resources. Growing 
urban populations also consume the majority of what is known as virtual water, or the embodied 
water capacity of all manufactured and traded goods and products consumed (Zhao et al. 2015). 
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Studies have mapped virtual water flows to reveal disproportionately high concentrations in both 
water-scarce and water-secure urban centers (i.e. both Beijing and Shanghai, respectively), 
contributing not only physical data, but also data on metaphysical resource flows, to an overall 
perception of water scarcity in China (Feng et al. 2014).  
North China especially faces physical scarcity from desertification so severe that 
policymakers have initiated a megaproject to divert water from the southern Yangzi to the 
Yellow River (Shapiro 2012, 48), named the South-North Water Transfer Project. This endeavor 
follows other major attempts at manmade restructuring of the landscape like the Three Gorges 
Dam, completed in 2006. Scholars use the term “technocratic” to explain modern Chinese policy, 
of using scientific and technological advances as a means to control resource flows; this control 
extends over all who rely on those resources (Moore 2014). Massive projects consume resources 
and pose costs to all sectors of society, not to mention environmental reparations such as 
pollution and disenfranchised populations.  
 The Chinese state has a longstanding legacy of water control to justify such colossal and 
often detrimental feats of technocratic engineering. This can be demonstrated using the South-
North Water Transfer Project as a case example. The project is designed to improve urban water 
supply in cities including Beijing, by physically redirecting 45 billion m3 of water annually from 
southern regions with little to spare, into a drought-stricken northern region trying to sustain the 
nation’s capital and industry centers (TheStructuralEngineer.info, 2018). On surficial review, the 
energy and resources required to physically redirect an already limited supply of clean water 
does not reveal a substantial payoff in the long term. Furthermore, intentionally reducing the 
water resources of one province at the benefit of another runs the risk of disenfranchising 
communities in the losing province. With all of these things considered, the Chinese government 
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still appears to depend upon physical reshaping of the water systems as a solution to scarcity. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Chinese government still relies on authoritarian 
control of water systems, like the sages did, in order to create state stability. However, historical 
patterns show that this method is inherently unsustainable.  
Water control systems are historically integral to China’s societal function. Early 
developments in hydraulic infrastructure contributed greatly to the country’s early economic 
development and success; reworking the landscape to such a vast capacity, sustained over a long 
period of time, has left a water system with foundations in ancient infrastructure left exposed to 
the changing nature of water patterns over time (Elvin, 2004) – in short, an inevitably unstable 
hydraulic system. In addition to this phenomenon, the post-reform era has brought with it 
unequally distributed water scarcity, affecting major portions of China. It is for this reason that 
administration cannot simply return to the ‘Way of the Sages’ like Emperor Wu did (see page 
12). Resource scarcity in any form was obviously not a contentious issue in ancient history, nor 
was there global competition for resources. Significant, however, are the lasting patterns in 
China’s hydraulic infrastructure that now pose a threat for excessive resource consumption. 
 Elvin explains this phenomenon well, in his documentation of lasting hydraulic patterns. 
Water and hydraulic systems are inherently violent, subject to power structures associated with 
control and distribution of resources. Water systems are regionally affected both by the 
landscape and climate; these include factors such as clean water availability, changes in the 
landscape, and geophysical characteristics. Over time, humans responded to these changes with 
new technologies of control, often accompanied by side effects such as pollution, droughts, low 
water channels, and sediment deposits. Socially, increasing competition for water resources 
resulted in individual socioeconomic standing being "inversely correlated" with clean or dirty 
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water (Elvin, 2004, 116). With advancing water use in industry, especially during the Deng 
administration, water allocation also became subject to conflicting resource needs, like drinking 
and washing water versus the need for strong currents for generating energy. 
 Elvin (2004) identifies a slow atrophy effect of premodern hydraulic techniques over time 
that contributed to lasting infrastructure problems. He uses historical examples of Lake Enlai, 
continued divisions and merges of the Yellow River, and ceaseless efforts to control and dredge 
human-contributed silt and sediment deposits from the river systems (140). In another example, 
there are specific accounts of the geometrical shapes of various enclosures of the Qiantang River 
system obstructed its flow in various ways over time, causing repeated damage to dikes, levees 
and other protective structures (Elvin, 2004, 152). He writes, 
 
 The present-day course of the lower Qiantang River is thus only a little more than two 
hundred years old. That its earlier pattern is wrongly shown in almost every published 
Western historical map, and all but a handful of Chinese ones, is a minor matter. What is 
important is, that in spite of serious efforts at engineering in the eighteenth century, the 
changes that have been described above were predominantly the work of natural forces 
outside human control. (Elvin, 2004, 152) 
 
Humans were indeed to blame for abnormally large sediment deposits in rivers over time. 
This was primarily due to irrigation efforts redirecting changing the force of the river, so that the 
sediment flowing from the river would not so easily be swept away by the ebbing tides, and 
instead would collect in the river basins and points of opening (Elvin, 2004, 153).  
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If technological lock-in of hydraulic systems began by the late Qing period as Elvin 
suggests, then it is concerning that the choice method of responding to climatic changes would 
be to physically redirect river systems. The Chinese government has framed the South-North 
Water Transfer as only a placeholder for suture solutions, yet this placeholder mirrors two-
thousand years of water control. However, alternative solutions are becoming more relevant 
through budding external modes of governance in China. 
 
Emergence of Civil Society 
 
 Modern China is the contemporary product of thousands of years of civilization, 
and as such civic discourse has been around equally as long. Only since the end of the Mao era 
has horizontal civil development been allowed and encouraged to occur; political reform, 
modernization and development of a market economy have further enabled its development 
(Kluver and Powers 1999). 
The assumption that China has been hesitant to allow horizontal development stems from 
Western connotations of civil society. Modern civil society expansion facilitates more citizen 
participation in governance, which presents a challenge to any regime if mismanaged. At its base 
civil society indicates an intermediary space between society and state, wherein associations and 
civic groups utilize resources to advocate for various causes (Unger 2008, Ming 2014). Western 
frameworks assume that civil society acts as a conduit for increased government transparency 
and accountability by facilitating citizen participation (Teets 2014), implicitly democratic in 
nature, posing an automatic threat to an authoritarian regime. Some authors cite this threat of 
democracy as an inevitable conflict to any non-democratic state. They consider civil society as a 
catalyst for too much public debate and thus lessened government control (Yuen 2015), offering 
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contentious rivalry to states that rely on information controls and propaganda to contain citizens. 
This is itself a skewed notion of propaganda, assuming it is confined to non-democratic states 
(on the contrary, it is well known that propaganda is a ubiquitous societal tool used by 
governments and politicians alike to promote any sort of agenda). In some literature, China is 
said to have “borrowed” civil society theory from the West to restructure its new market 
influenced state-society relations and construct a framework for modernization (Jirong 2014). 
This does not necessarily assume democratization, but can be problematic if the ensuing 
discussion disregards the long history of Chinese civilization.  
Classical Chinese intellectual traditions had no vocabulary for civil society, until the 
Chinese equivalent was adapted from the Western translation during the modern era (Madsen, 
2002, 190). Because there is a relative dissonance between the Western orientations of the term 
civil society and the existence of a Chinese civic sphere, “civil society and new ways of 
developing such a society, even if they are not completely sure what to call it and how to link it – 
if it can be linked at all – with their cultural traditions” (Madsen, 2002, 190). This initial 
distinction between civic discourse and formal civil society helps to separate a growing 
understanding of contemporary Chinese civil society from China’s long civic history.  
Scholars like Richard Madsen present alternative theories of developing civil society in 
China that originate from a non-Western context. In Madsen’s case, this involves a neo-
Confucian interpretation of civic associational life. While some of his content is more 
aspirational than established, he does reflect well upon the lasting effects of Confucianism on 
modern Chinese associational life. He notes that a framework for civil society that originated out 
of Western enlightenment thinking is fundamentally different in structure than its Chinese 
counterpart. Where Western social units have clear demarcations based on various 
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classifications, Chinese society is more fluid, wherein social influence stems from an individual 
and ripples into larger social circles (Madsen, 2002, 192). In other words, Chinese social 
affiliations are produced on a more holistic, less rigid condition. Within this configuration, it 
becomes more difficult to create rigid boundaries between public and private institutions, and 
categorize forms of association. It also forms a lack of a coherent distinction of a civil sphere. In 
this case, kinship values including these ripples of social affiliation must be taken into account in 
an analysis of any association in the civic sphere, in order to fully understand its role and effect.    
Given the longevity of Confucianism in governance of civic systems, namely in the case 
of hydraulics, it is unlikely that those values would be completely disregarded in any endemic 
Chinese civic associations. Given that associational life in China is based on a community scale 
and influenced by kinship networks, there are certain organizational factors associated with 
Confucian and neo-Confucian social orientation that can impact civic participation. For instance, 
many agricultural communities in rural provinces rely on village organizations to direct 
associational life. These organizations rely on a series of community interfaces that integrate 
Chinese kinship networks into the organizational structure of the village association (Plummer 
and Taylor, 2004, 69). These relationships and cultural nuances dictate member participation and 
roles, and are often directly integrated with the community structure. This is why modern 
organizational civic life in China has stemmed from the grassroots, as opposed to external 
interference.  
 Instead of using just the term for society (shehui 社会), Madsen suggests using the term 
minjian shehui (民间社会) which means people-based society (Madsen, 2002, 193). This 
changes the terminology to a phrase that mirrors the ripple effect of Chinese associational life. It 
also has the important effect of reducing the urge to "assume that people-based groups cannot 
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properly exist without the general permission, guidance, and supervision of the government" 
(Madsen, 2002, 193). This idea also encourages an outlook of the government not as interfering 
with private life in a top-down manner, but ideally as an entity able to recognize autonomy 
where it is due. In fact, Madsen cites a reluctance of Chinese and Taiwanese associations to 
declare full autonomy from the security and benefits of government support (193). Madsen is 
keen to note that the Confucianism taught by Mencius does not include additional Legalist 
notions of strict hierarchies; rather, it is a system of reciprocity between family members and 
other relationships focused on correcting immoral behavior (Madsen, 2002, 195). Nevertheless, 
he writes "there is less principled support for moral pluralism and more of a tendency to equate 
civility with social consensus than there would be in the classic liberal or the liberal egalitarian 
visions" (Madsen, 2002, 198).  
Madsen’s pure Confucian vision contrasted with the reality of form that civil society is 
taking in China reveals the clash of Legalist and Confucian thought, even in the modern time. 
The state’s desire to exercise authority over horizontal development that is already susceptible to 
Madsen’s suggestions of social consensus reveals the clash of Legalist advocacy of full state 
authority, and Confucian advocacy of leading through the people. Allowing civic development to 
infiltrate the hydraulic sector that the state has been struggling to control is a perfect 
demonstration of these ideological challenges. Where efforts like the South-North Water 
Transfer Project implemented by the state appear to be so unstable, allowing civic associations to 





Cases for Sustainability of Chinese Hydraulic Systems 
 
Overview of Civic Associational Development 
 
 Modern ecological crises and disasters affect larger and denser populations, and relief aid 
distribution can no longer be confined to the responsibilities of the state. Initially, the majority of 
NGOs endemic to China originated in the grassroots. For instance, the Sichuan earthquake of 
2008 required more responding power than the government could lend, and multiple volunteer 
groups interested in distributing aid and relief for the victims emerged from the grassroots 
(Bragg, 2003). Crisis lends a context of opportunity for civic associations and services to emerge 
and take action external to the role of the government, creating a new sector for themselves in 
civil society. This space requires “a state that can provide order and create the political and 
regulatory framework within which civil society organizations can pursue their goals in a 
nonviolent manner” (Bragg 2003, 194). The widespread benefits of allowing such organizations 
to act in relief and take part in other humanitarian sectors spurred the Communist Party to rapidly 
adjust policy that would be more accommodating to increased NGO activity. The Party now 
grapples with creating more stringent regulatory devices against potentially destabilizing outside 
influences, while avoiding any policies that might stifle expansion of these groups.   
 The term “authoritarian environmentalism” has emerged in response to the dominant 
literature framework of democratic environmentalism, which does not allow for expanded 
understandings of developing environmental consciousness in a non-democratic state. This 
phenomenon is understood by some to mean a central authority wielding the ability to produce a 
rapid, concentrated response to a single threat, able to mobilize large forces without obstruction 
(Gilley 2012). The Chinese Five-Year Plan system exemplifies this type of environmentalism; it 
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establishes a predetermined budget for every industry area, including environmental sectors. This 
method of governance excludes or fragments certain social actors (Gilley 2012). In some cases, 
this is evident by improper community participation, or lack thereof. During the Mao Zedong 
period, the government exerted total control over state functions and policy, with no community 
or citizen activism. Later, the Deng administration initiated reform by allowing the people 
themselves to conduct administration of agriculture on a community level, and rewarded 
innovation where it was previously discouraged. No longer restrained by a quota system that 
determined how much they could produce, farmers were motivated to expand their output, and 
suddenly exerted some shaping influence over agricultural policy. 
 Later, the state quickly recognized the benefit of the hundreds of thousands of grassroots 
organizations that formed in the wake of the catastrophic damage emerging out of 
industrialization. These groups act on a community level, in response to welfare challenges, 
disaster relief and other social challenges. Citizen participation on the provincial and individual 
levels is now a key asset in adapting to water shortages. Farmers are able to make decisions 
towards water saving techniques in irrigation and agriculture, waste management, maintenance 
and flooding (Taylor, 2004). The government relies on feedback at these levels as a means to 
inform overarching policy decisions at an administrative level. Sequentially beginning with the 
1982 12th CCP National Conference, the Party endorsed grassroots development, then specified 
grassroots democracy, and later included more policies to enhance social development and self-
governance strategies at a community level (Jirong 2014). This demonstrates the fact that initial 
expansion of the civil society space was initiated by official government policy, a sign of at least 
some state endorsement.  
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Chinese Characteristics of Civic Associations 
 
Most environmental NGOs are not directly affiliated with the government other than their 
compliance with its regulations (Schwartz 2004), and thus can access channels of governance 
without direct control by the state. They are private institutions and thus have some difficulty 
obtaining funding within a system that dislikes foreign aid, yet they are not able to utilize state 
assets (Schwartz 2004, 37). They perhaps face the most obstacles within China based on the 
government’s aversion to the Western interpretation of NGOs as democratizing elements. They 
end up lacking in human capital, and they tread the line between affiliating too closely with any 
one region and maintaining the good graces of the government (Schwartz 2004). 
 Environmental Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGO’s), 
on the other hand, avoid many of these shortcomings because they have the explicit approval of 
the government branches funding them. They employ skilled bureaucrats who are used to 
Chinese politics and, as a result, have more room to operate. Nevertheless, they can be prone to 
corruption and are criticized for lacking enough autonomy from the state (Schwartz 2004). Semi-
NGO’s are most capable of policy influence due to the higher quality of their work, their 
affiliation with and funding from the Chinese university system, and the wider range of 
independence they enjoy from the other two. This is because they often originate as GONGO’s 
or government bodies, or they incorporate members from said positions who work well within 
the Chinese system.  
These developments are not without constant policy adjustment by the Party; 
policymakers are constantly trying to achieve a balance between ‘harmonious society’ and social 
autonomy, and sustained authority of party branches in these localities (Jirong 2014, 209).  
Trying to predict the direction of these policy changes is a blurry area. Researchers perform 
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studies to uncover hints of a potential new democracy in China in various ways, such as 
assessing student interest in environmental activism or protest (Stalley et al. 2006), observing 
media activism and other art forms for radical tendencies (Margherita 2014), environmental 
artists (Schell 2014), or through more traditional case studies of public awareness and 
environmental social activism (Wu 2009).  
Searching for an emerging Western-style of democracy out of this grassroots 
phenomenon might be misdirected at best; in recent years, the Party has developed strengthening 
policy initiatives to envelop civil society into a larger governance framework. Mencius mandated 
that "Heaven sees according as the People see, Heaven hears according as the People hear", 
incorporating some more democratic aspects to Confucian thought that previously focused less 
on government administration and more on individual and social knowledge (Needham & Wang, 
1956, 16). Wherein these thinkers sought to not only indoctrinate their pupils with social theory 
and philosophy, they also wanted the government to privilege the welfare of the people over state 
wealth. Revolutionary movements, even those contentious as that which brought Mao to power, 
present a critique or discord toward the relationship of the state to its people, maintaining a 
central focus on the people.1 The legacy of the Discourses on Salt and Iron demonstrate conflicts 
in opinion of how best to wield state power and authority. Political scientist Ming Wan writes, 
 
The managers of the empire argued for practical solutions such as state monopolies of 
salt and iron to centralize the state and conquer the nomadic Xiongnu and touted policy 
successes they achieved from this. Their scholar critics wanted moral principles rather 
                                                      
1 This is not to condone biases of class, socioeconomic status, gender, and other statuses/identities that have been 
perpetuated and even violently enforced in history, especially during the Mao era. These revolutions are not always 
beneficial or successful, and do not always achieve the desired quality of life.  
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than material calculations to guide policy and asserted that human suffering caused by 
monopolies and expansionary war would doom the empire. This tension between ideals 
and political necessities created an ideational foundation for the successful Chinese 
empire, which then lasted for two millennia… China has had its own imperial overreach 
and understands the cost of extensive adventures beyond its borders and how excessive 
reliance on force abroad might threaten their domestic political order, which is what the 
current Chinese government is most concerned about. (Wan, 2012, 1) 
 
Creating aspects of a harmonious society while keeping the state in service to the people 
have historically been central to maintaining the Chinese domestic political order Wan mentions. 
During the Mao period, citizen education and the role of civic life was curated with the intention 
to indoctrinate the people according to Maoist thought, an exercise in state dominance of social 
order. Further onward into the modern period, the private sector and the state still struggle over 
issues brought up by the Discourses including monopolies of industry and agriculture. For 
instance, recent allowances (as of 2017) have been made for salt producers to sell directly to the 
market – a recent change to a two-thousand-year-old monopoly on salt (Hancock, 2017).  
 
From Ideological Changes, to Substantive Cases 
 
A brief analysis of cases of policy, and the new levels of organization incorporated into 
associational life will serve to illuminate the changes taking place. Given the water scarcity 
afflicting the mainland, state policy is intended to allocate clean and potable water resources as it 
sees fit. However, water usage is divided in China between sectors, stretched between industries 
and human consumption. Still more is lost to pollution from factories and mismanagement. 
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While there are some NGO’s and organizations dedicated towards increasing water quality and 
access for individual communities, there are others organized toward a more holistic approach of 
water allocation in general. After a brief overview of recent changes to NGO policy, a few cases 
specific to the water sector will be addressed to demonstrate such efforts. 
The post-reform period of environmental policymaking demonstrated a shift from loose 
local restrictions, to the state applying a top-down approach to reign in local activities (Kostka 
and Nahm, 2017). The Party system has within the past decade advanced its regulations on NGO 
registration and activity, especially on foreign NGOs (Yuen 2015). As it stands, a foreign NGO 
cannot prescribe to an aspect of the Chinese system and expect to integrate flawlessly, though 
most active NGOs are either partnered with an external funding source or have a parent 
organization outside of the Party state. The government uses NGO registration to exert authority 
over an organization as it sees fit, and thus registration is a highly politicized activity. A major 
portion of social organizations remain unregistered and rely on external sources of funding and 
resources to function, whether due to scale or political motivations, and in some cases, are even 
encouraged by provincial level governments for economic or political reasons (Hildebrandt 
2011). However, the government is showing an increased willingness to encourage harmony 
between foreign and external NGO’s and local organizations. 
As of 2017, three laws have stood out in the foreign NGO sector of Chinese policy. These 
are the Charity Law, the FNGO Law, and the Reform Opinion, which apply directly to foreign 
NGO's seeking to register in China (Policy Analysis, 2017). They officially legalize state 
monitoring of domestic and foreign NGO's, effectively ending the chance for shady political 
suppression of some NGO's. Laws such as these extend the security net of the state over external 
NGO's as well as grassroots. In other words, they legitimize the role of these associations have in 
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shaping state policy. There are still extensive shortcomings to the flexibility, breadth and 
privileges of associations in China, especially with those addressing contentious areas like 
human rights and acting within certain regions. Additionally, it is a highly complicated 
procedure for some external organizations to register with the state, although these vetting 
processes are consistently being alleviated (Policy Analysis, 2017). 
The role of external organizations in enhancing community participation is growing, 
especially in areas such as rural development. Many of these organizations serve as educational 
tools, working with local village organizations to improve efficacy and outreach (Plummer & 
Taylor, 2004, 82). These interactions require a substantial learning curve on either end, wherein 
mediation between organizations is necessary to transcend cultural boundaries, most essential for 
the external organization to become accustomed with the networks of social organization and 
interaction in the area. With these caveats, often the primary benefit to involving external 
organizations revolves around an influx of funding. In terms of water, this is especially beneficial 
for poor rural communities suffering from dilapidated hydraulic infrastructure and little state 
financing.  
A case study of one such community demonstrates the specific intersections of external 
with community life: 
 
Researchers Li Ou, Tim Zachernuk and Han Yong document the Piyuan Canal 
Rehabilitation Project (PCRP), initiated in 1998 by the Dutch government in partnership 
with local organizations Funded US $10 million from Dutch sources and US $5 million 
from the Chinese government, the project sought community relief through the 
rehabilitation of the Piyuan Canal. Construction for the canal began during the Great 
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Leap period (1958-61), but was never fully completed and thus did not efficiently 
contribute to irrigation. They write, “This is a result of low design standards, poor 
construction quality and, especially, the lack of operation and maintenance mechanisms” 
(231). The key feature of the rehabilitation project was to introduce Water User 
Associations (WUA) as a key component for maintaining the project. The second key 
component to success for the project was the money provided by the international donors 
toward the project. The authors note, “At a national level, it has been recognized that the 
existing management system of the large and medium-sized irrigation districts can no 
longer meet the demand for the development – and the [maintenance] – of irrigation 
systems” (233).  
The authors also note the presence of “institutional problems” concerning the lack 
of appropriate governance structure at the community level for maintenance of canal and 
irrigation systems (235). These include old compulsory labor practices, which resulted in 
poor management, as well as a lack of efficient tax measures. The primary measures for 
reform and maintenance of the canal system was a direct participatory role for the water 
users, including farmers, on a structured planning basis. The key components of the user 
base consisted of stakeholders for the project, at every level from individual to township, 
to commercial and government officials. This ensured a system of checks at every level 
of management, at a level of inclusiveness not previously achieved.  (Ou et al., in 
Plummer & Taylor eds., 2004, 230-268). 
 
 The primary takeaway from a case study like this one is the role the external organization 
plays in alleviating water-based strain on the community, enhancing the government but 
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mobilizing the people. It also demonstrates an essential lack of dominant state authority in an 
area of water governance. External organizations are for various reasons recognizing the dormant 
resource potential of an area, and through facilitation of developing NGO laws in China are able 
to access the area to create sustained change. They are demonstrating the revival of a community 
that was suffering from instability due to state negligence. Through the aid of an external entity, 
the community is reclaiming governance if a hydraulic system on a local scale, without affecting 
regime stability of the Chinese government thanks to its participation. Here lies one pathway for 
local implementation of hydraulic rehabilitation. It shucks the Legalist assumption of full 
authoritarian control of a resource, while promoting Confucian methods for giving prominence 
to the welfare of the people as a resource for state power. It reveals an avenue for the state to 
remain legitimate by adhering to Confucian tradition, while allowing the aid of external 













Analysis and Conclusion 
 
 Through massive infrastructural projects intended to reallocate water, the Chinese 
government is attempting a short-term, unsustainable solution to a crisis of water scarcity. 
Internally, the Chinese state has little experience dealing with such a crisis that cannot be solved 
with better control of water; rather than scarcity, the country has always feared floods. However, 
the new flood presented to the Chinese state is one that has been gradually building throughout 
time, manifesting in the form of recurring conflicts in social order and governance structure. 
Returning to the story of Emperor Wu clarifies this point: 
 
 Upon surveying a break in the Yellow River at Hu-tzu, the emperor realized that there 
were few trees left to form barriers, as the people had deforested the area for agricultural 
purposes. He was distraught because there was no immediate way to close the river 
breach in the traditional way. Rather than thinking of an alternative solution to the 
problem, like allowing the river to stay its new course and resettling the people, the 
Emperor blamed the people for using up the available resources to dam the breach. He 
sang, 
Let us return to the old channel, 
And we will truly bless the gods… 
The river rages on… 
But there is not enough brushwood –  
The fault of the people of Wei.  
They have wasted the land with fire… 
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After Wu successfully gathered enough resources to close the breach, he was convinced 
that the people were given too much authority over their resources and technology. He 
later initiated the monopolies on salt and iron, setting the stage for the government of 
China to exert more and more control over the resources of the land. (Watson, 1961, 76-
77) 
 
 As this story demonstrates, and repeated with each recurrence of debates similar to the 
Discourses on Salt and Iron, the Chinese state has demonstrated a paradoxical unwillingness to 
allocate too much resource authority to the people while refusing to modernize its governance 
strategies. Like the Emperor Wu who lamented the people and the river from straying away from 
the Way of the sages, the Chinese state has demonstrated a reluctance to seek non-traditional 
modes of water governance. Instead, replacing premodern river control technologies with even 
more advanced and grand technologies has been the state’s placeholder, instead of moving away 
from authoritarian river control methods altogether. However, the trends indicated in this paper 
reveal a very gradual, reluctant exploration toward permitting lessened state authority over 
resources, at least in the case of water.  Man-made redirecting of water is not a sustainable 
solution so long as water is scarce, and will not contribute to lasting regime stability, no matter 
how grand the canal project. The way of the sages for water control is no longer a feasible 








 For this thesis project, I performed a classical exegesis of translated early Chinese texts, 
conducted electronic database research, and reviewed periodicals as well as applied literary 
materials. This paper is an attempt of a Foucauldian genealogy of ideas presenting an intellectual 
history of Chinese hydraulic thinking and associated governance methods. My intention in doing 
so was to pose a challenge to the existing perception of modernism in Chinese sustainable 
thinking, by presenting historical evidence of longstanding patterns of unsustainable governance 
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